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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPT OF CLEARNESS
BY E. B. TITCHENER
In 1913 C. A. Britz published a thesis for the Zurich
doctorate entitled Eine theoretische und experimented Unter-
suchung uber den psychologischen Begriff der Klarheit. Cir-
cumstances over which I have no control postponed my
first-hand acquaintance with the work to 1916. I have re-
gretted this the more because Britz deals in detail with two
psychological systems in which the notion of clearness holds
a prominent place, Wundt's and my own. Wundt he chose
for obvious reasons; myself, because my 'Standpunkt stellt
quasi ein Extrem dar.' Both of us receive a severe mauling:
which would be wholesome enough—since the criticism is
objective and based upon quotation—if only Britz had fol-
lowed a sound method. He has not. He struggles with the
Wundtian concepts of clearness and degree of consciousness
on the basis of the sixth edition of the ' Physiologische Psy-
chologie' and the seventh of the 'Grundriss'; and it never
occurs to him that the key to their understanding is a genetic
study of his author. He attacks my concept of sensory
clearness on the basis of my 'Text-book' and of Hillebrand's
review of my 'Feeling and Attention' in the Zeitschrift; he
has not referred, incredible as the thing appears, to the
Feeling and Attention itself.
External circumstances may be in part responsible. The
thesis was undertaken at Schumann's suggestion, and the
experimental portion was apparently completed under his
direction at Frankfurt. The author, however, returned for
his doctorate to his old university, and the thesis was accepted
by G. F. Lipps of Zurich. It is a fair assumption (is it not?)
that Schumann was chiefly interested in the experiments,
and that Lipps was generously disposed to a bit of work
originated and approved by a psychological colleague else-
where. In that case the critical chapters, about seventy per-
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cent of the whole paper, would have fallen, so to say, between
the two professorial chairs. Even so it is astonishing that
Britz should not have learned for himself the essentials of
scientific method.
I
I do not imagine that Wundt will find time to defend his
system against these latest charges, and I do not propose to
undertake the business for him. I shall, however, try to set
forth, in the light of a genetic study, the use and meaning of
the technical terms here in question. Such a study is doubly
instructive. It shows our modern psychology in the making;
the long series of Wundt's books reflects the recent history
of the science. It shows also the manner of Wundt's own
progress from logic to psychology, from activity to content.
His fundamental ideas have remained, for the most part,
unchanged; advance is made, habitually, by modification in
detail, by expansion and contraction, by redistribution of
topics and change of emphasis. Even when the system
suffers a decided innovation (we shall have a case presently),
there are always hints of the new departure, if we look closely
enough, in the previous work. Here, of course, I have space
only to give results. I hope to be able, nevertheless, to clear
up the difficulties which Britz and, perhaps, other readers
have found in the sixth edition of the ' Physiologische Psy-
chologic'
We are to ask, accordingly, what Wundt means by con-
sciousness and degrees of consciousness, by clearness, by
degrees of apperception, and especially what is the relation
between degree of consciousness and degree of clearness. We
begin with consciousness.
The keynote of Wundt's psychological treatment of con-
sciousness is the notion of synthesis. Consciousness, the
condition of all inner experience (1-5)1 or, more empirically,
the total contents of our immediate experience (6), cannot
be defined in psychological terms. We must be satisfied to
determine its conditions (1), that is, the phenomena that
1
 By these numbers I indicate the editions in which the particular phrase occurs;
minor verbal changes must here be disregarded. References are given in later notes.
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invariably accompany its manifestation in experience (2-5);
more exactly, we must be content to give the conditions under
which we observe such phenomena as we attribute to a con-
sciousness (6). There are, now, two psychological processes
which are bound up with consciousness and may be regarded
as its essential characters. The first of these is the formation
of ideas (and real feelings) from sensations (and simple
feelings). Our consciousness of ideas consists in the act of
synthesis whereby sensations are brought into temporal and
spatial form (1); in every act of ideation there is effected a
connection of elementary sensations (2-4). Ideas and real
feelings arise from a psychological synthesis of elements, and
this connection of elements is therefore one of the two charac-
teristics of consciousness (5, 6). The other is to be found in
the processes of reproduction and association of ideas (and
feelings). The connection of ideas takes place in conscious-
ness (1); it is only by way of reproduction and association
that consciousness can become aware of itself as persisting
without change through all the change of ideas (1—3); this
changing flow of ideas is itself aware of consciousness as a
synthetic activity connecting present ideas with those that
have gone before (1-3). Consciousness is empirically demon-
strable only on condition (unter der Voraussetzung) of a con-
nection of the ideas (and feelings) which follow one another
in time (4, 5); reproduction and association are therefore an
universal concomitant of consciousness (6). An orderly
connection of ideas (1-4) or, in more general phrase, a con-
nection of immediate experiences (5, 6) is, indeed, the con-
dition under which alone consciousness appears.
If, however, the primary thing about consciousness is
synthesis, then we must recognize the possibility of degrees
or grades of consciousness, since such connections as that of
sensations in the temporal or spatial idea may exist at various
levels (1). Self-observation reveals these degrees. "When-
ever we incorporate an impression but loosely in the context
of our ideas, or later remember it but imperfectly by reason
of this looseness of connection, we credit ourselves only with a
lower degree of consciousness at the time in question" (2-6).
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In these instances, capacity for the connection of ideas (or
psychical contents) is taken as measure of degree of con-
sciousness (2-5); or, as Wundt puts it in his final phrasing,
"the connection of psychical contents is a certain measure of
degree of consciousness" (6). Every connection of inner
states (or psychical elements) manifests some degree of
consciousness (2-6).
That is the Wundtian doctrine of consciousness and its
degrees, as set forth in the various editions of his great work.1
The intention of the discussion, from the very first, is psycho-
logical; even in 1874 Wundt is combating the logical tenden-
cies which showed their full force in the Vorlesungen of 1863.2
His effort is not immediately successful; but, by degrees,
changing here a little and there a little, he moves away from
logic toward psychology, away from synthetic activity
toward observable connection. There is no reason to think
that he was, at every stage, fully aware of the significance of
the changes; he probably chose the wording that seemed, at
the time, best to express his thought—his original no less than
his present thought. In point of fact the corrections of the
early text serve in sum to change the whole atmosphere of the
discussion.
We find the same sort of progress in the treatment of
attention. The discussion of 1874 begins as follows: "In
the synthesis of sensations and in the association of ideas
consciousness apprehends itself as active. Thus arises that
expression of consciousness which we name attention. It
makes itself known in direct self-observation by the fact that
the interconnection of ideas, with which consciousness is
correlated, is by no means present to it at all times in the
same manner; consciousness is directed upon certain ideas in
higher measure than upon others." Later we have: "Beside
the coming and going of ideas we perceive within us not
infrequently (in varying fashion) and more or less plainly
an (inner) activity which we designate attention" (2-6).
1Phys. Psyck., 1874, 707 f., 711 ff., 717; 1880, II., 195 f., 199, 201; 1887, II.,
225 f., 229, 231; 1893, II., 255 f., 259. 261; 1903, III., 320 f., 324 f.; 1911, III., 296, f^
299 f.
»See op. cit., 1874, 708 ff.
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Degree of apperception is gauged by the subjective activity
with which consciousness turns to a particular sensory stimu-
lus (1-5). The simile of Blickpunkt and Blickfeld, the state-
ment that the Punkt is really a small Feld of varying extent
and that the main field darkens in proportion as the central
field brightens, and the distinction of perception and apper-
ception are present in all editions. Passive and active apper-
ception are distinguished in the second, the limen of conscious-
ness and the limen of attention only in the fourth edition.
All these things are familiar, and need not be dwelt upon.
What now of clearness, which ultimately becomes the sole
objective criterion of apperception?
The brightening of the Blickpunkt means, as we have
seen, that consciousness is directed upon certain ideas in
higher measure than upon others (1-4); certain contents
become more conscious than others (5); we observe in con-
sciousness different degrees of conscious status, variously and
varyingly distributed over its contents (6). If we consider
the apperceived contents themselves, we find the following
progression. We begin with a clearness of ideas, dependent
partly on the intensity of the ideas and partly on adaptation
of attention (1-3). Presently this clearness, dependent now
upon the intensity of the sensations composing the ideas and
upon adaptation of attention, is paired with distinctness;
clearness is predicable of an idea in its own right, distinctness
of an idea in its relation to other ideas. Feelings may be
distinct, but apparently can not be clear (4). Later still this
same clearness attaches to all complex conscious contents:
to ideas and feelings as wholes, and also to particular ele-
ments within ideas and feelings (5, 6). Clearness, which
originally belonged to ideas alone, thus remains to the end a
character of complex contents. "Clearness and distinctness
are exclusively characters of ideas, and may be transferred
to sensations only when these are considered as constituents
of ideas" (6).1
All this is fairly straightforward, though I must warn the
1
 Op. cit., 1874, 717 f., 720, 722, 725, 729; 1880, II., 205 f., 208, 209, 212; 1887,
II., 235 f., 238,239,244; 1893, II., 266,267,269,271,272,282; 1903, i n . , 331,332 f.,
336. 337 U 339, 348, 349; 19", HI., 306, 307 f., 312 f., 314, 322, 323.
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reader that I have passed over certain passages which will
occupy us later. The pairing of distinctness with clearness
offers no difficulty; distinctness is always the subordinate
concept, and does not appear in the final summary of the
part-processes in an apperception.1 The irruption of the
new theory of feeling, in the fifth edition, does create a diffi-
culty—as I pointed out in Feeling and Attention—but it is
not one that directly concerns us here.
We are therefore ready to take up, in a preliminary way,
the relation of consciousness to attention and of degree of
consciousness to degree of clearness. The first of these
questions is easily answered. Consciousness, for Wundt, is
always wider than attention. In 1874 he wrote: "The
theory that consciousness and attention are identical is not
tenable." In 1911 he writes: "An impression that has sunk
below the limen of apperception does not therewith disappear
from consciousness;" and his whole treatment of the two
topics, from first to last, implies this distinction.2 Conscious-
ness is the total contents of our immediate experience; atten-
tion is the range of clear experience.
The second question may be answered, to begin with, by
the statement that degree of consciousness and degree of
clearness have, logically, no connection with each other.
Degree of consciousness is degree of organization of conscious
contents. Let us imagine (if we can) a consciousness with-
out attention. Such a consciousness would still show degrees
of consciousness, because the complex contents and the
groups of complex contents which make it up would differ
in closeness of connection or organization. There are pass-
ages in the first edition which seem to come very near to
such an imaginary consciousness;3 and the recurring phrase
" I t is always association that puts ideas at the disposal of
apperception" at any rate suggests it.4 In reality, however,
1
 See op. cit., 1911, III., 316.
• Op. cit., 1874, 725; 1911, III., 314.
»Op. cit., 1874, 79s, 835.
'irase
, III.,
498:
* Op. cit., 1880, II., 212; 1887, II., 244; 1893, II., 279. I do not find the ph
in the two last editions; and indeed it goes too far. See 1903, III., 524 {.; 1911  ]
 f.
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consciousness comes to us in other guise. It makes its own
history from the very outset, and carries that history with it;
and the history is constantly interfering, so to say, with its
present course.1 Or, to put the same thing from another
point of view, it is organized, at whatever level and in what-
ever degree, as an attentive consciousness; associations are
formed in passive, apperceptive connections in active atten-
tion.2 While, then, degree of consciousness (or of organiza-
tion) and degree of clearness (or of conscious status) may be
distinguished logically, empirically they are bound together
in the most complicated fashion. One might suppose, per-
haps, that the difference between range of consciousness and
range of attention should be directly observable. Wundt
does not deny it, though he seems to think otherwise; it is a
subsequent apperception that ordinarily makes us aware of
the obscure fringe; and he does deny that the simultaneous
method is adequate to range of consciousness.3 One might
suppose, again, that degree of consciousness and degree of
clearness should run parallel; and in many cases, at many
moments of the history of consciousness, they doubtless do;
but we must remember that the one tends to be stable and
the other is essentially instable. Consider, indeed, any case
of active attention. The complex contents that now He in
the obscurity of the Blickfeld, and that therefore have no
conscious status whatever, were once (probably, many times
over) given in passive apperception, in so far as they are
organized at all; and if their organization is high, as it may
be, they were given in active apperception. The complex
contents that occupy the Blickpunkt and therefore possess
various degrees of conscious status vary in degree of conscious-
ness, from moment to moment, according as apperception is
integrative or disruptive and their organization is corre-
spondingly strengthened or weakened. Or consider observa-
tion itself. Observation is always apperception; and we
cannot become aware of a low degree of consciousness unless
1
 Op. tit., 1893, II., 284.
1
 See W. B. Pillsbury, Amtr. J. of Psychol., 1897, 8, 329 ff.
1
 Op. cit., 1911, III., 324, 330; cf. 1903, III., 351 ff., and the stronger statements
of 1874, 726; 1880, II., 219; 1887, II., 261; 1893, II., 305.
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we give the poorly organized contents a high conscious
status.1 So the empirical relation of the two degrees (and I
have, of course, greatly oversimplified it in this brief account)
is complex in the extreme. Neither can exist without the
other; yet, since they do not run on parallel lines, their
separate treatment is a matter of practical convenience, if
not of necessity; a full account, historical and descriptive, of
any given consciousness implies constant reference to both.
If Wundt inclines, even in his latest writing, to make connec-
tion the fundamental character of consciousness and to
regard attention as an activity within consciousness2—when
we might expect him to give the two factors equal rank—
the reasons are historical, and not least among them is his
reaction against unconscious ideas.
I believe that these answers to our two questions are
fair, and that they represent the essentials of Wundt's
doctrine; I confess that I have rounded off some rather
prickly passages.3 We have now to consider those divergent
statements to which I have already referred.
1
 After a good deal of vacillation, Wundt settles down in the sixth edition to the
definite terminological distinction of Bewusstsiinsstuje or Grad des Bewusstseins and
Grad dcr Bewusstheit: 1911, III., 299, 307. I have made this distinction throughout,
and have translated Bewussthext by 'conscious status.'
1
 Op. cit., 1911, III., 301.
•Let me give an instance! Wundt teaches that the contents at the Blickpunkt
(an area, be it remembered) are variously clear, and the contents in the outlying
Blickjcld obscure. In 1903, III., 353 (1911, III., 326) we are introduced to Grade der
Verdunkelung, degrees of obscurity. It looks, then, as if the contents below the
limen of attention might possess something more than degree of consciousness (which
is all that I have allowed them in the text), something that is, after all, very like
conscious status. I have, however, pointed out in 'Feeling and Attention' that there
is here a confusion of apperception with cognition, of attributive with cognitive clear-
ness, and that a recent worker in Wundt's own laboratory has called attention to it
(see 237 ff., 369, and cf. 230 f.). I have already remarked that Wundt's progress is
from activity to content: it is not till the fifth edition that 'consciousness' ceases to
be 'directed upon ideas,1 and that 'contents become more conscious': cf. 1903, III.,
333 with 1893, II., 267.
Again, in 1902, I., 323 (1908, I., 382) we are told that change of clearness, as
distinguished from change of intensity, alters the relation between contents; clearness
thus seems to be confused with distinctness. But the passage in which this state-
ment occurs is not represented in 1893; it harks back to 1887, I., 237, an edition in
which the distinction of clearness and distinctness had not yet been drawn. The
clearness of 1902 and 1908 (in these particular sentences) is therefore an undifferentiated
clearness and distinctness.
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The discussion of the apperception-center in the fifth
edition surprises us by a reference to the clearness of sensa-
tion: surprises us all the more because the earlier editions
spoke in the same context only of the clearness of ideas and
impressions; because the same volume teaches that sensations
are constituted solely of intensity and quality; and because
the same edition, in a later volume, retains the orthodox
view that clearness and distinctness are exclusively characters
of ideas. This third volume adds, however, that clearness
may be predicated of sensations when they are considered
as constituents of ideas (the fundamental of a compound
tone, the color of a visual form); and so it seemed possible to
interpret the sensations which become clear in apperception
as sensations-in-ideas.1 That was a way out of the difficulty;
it was not the way the offending passage read. Those who
know the 'Physiologische Psychologie' historically know,
however, that its exposition is continually changing in detail,
and that the details are likely to prove important; I have
made the point earlier in this paper. So one hoped for more
light in a sixth edition; and the light came with a vengeance!
The reference to clearness of sensations in the discussion of
the apperception-center is now justified by entirely new
matter, which introduces the chapter on Intensity of Sensa-
tion. There are (we learn) intensive psychical magnitudes,
which accrue only to the simple elements of the mental life,
and there are extensive psychical magnitudes, which result
from the composition of elements. The three intensive mag-
nitudes are intensity, quality, and—clearness. And these
three characters are three coordinate dimensions of the
psychical elements; they are, that is to say, attributes of sensa-
tion. Compound contents show different degrees of clear-
ness in their different parts; degree of clearness is unequivocal
1
 Op. cit., 1902,1., 322 f., 353; 1903, III., 338,349; cf. 1880,1., 2i8; 1887,1., 233;
1893, I., 228. These passages are to be sharply distinguished from the casual and
physiologically motived reference to the apperception of sensations (correlates of the
excitation of a sensory center) which occurs in 1902, I., 324, and which appears in all
editions from the second to the sixth.
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only in regard to the elements, to simple contents. Wundt's
statements are as definite as they could well be.1
Here, then, is a new kind of clearness, different from the
original clearness of ideas and real feelings, different also
from the clearness of the sensations-in-ideas. Wundt has
not made a clean sweep of things, however, even in this
volume; the old statement, running through all the editions,
that sensations are constituted solely of intensity and quality,2
is allowed to remain. A pure oversight, no doubt! The
few references to clearness in the second volume, of 1910, are
neutral. But then we come to the third volume, of 1911,
and there we are back again in the familiar atmosphere,
with the express assurance that clearness and distinctness
are exclusively characters of ideas! Could ever anything be
more bewildering?
Well! our bewilderment is at any rate less than Britz's.
For our genetic study proves that the two clearnesses do not
stand on a level. The clearness of the third volume, of 1911,
is the traditional clearness of the Wundtian system, deeply
rooted in nearly forty years of thought and expression; the
clearness of the first volume, of 1908, is a new phenomenon,
only casually foreshadowed in the corresponding volume of
1902. Something, it appears, was moving Wundt's ideas,
even at the earlier date, towards sensory clearness; and
something happened, between the fifth and sixth editions, to
precipitate and crystallize his ideas.3 Thereafter, in the
interval between 1908 and 1911, his interests turned away
from this something; he had forgotten all about his intensive
1
 Op. cit., III., 1908, I., 539 ff. I myself urged as early as 1898 that clear-
ness should be recognized as a sensory attribute, but printed no extended discussion
of the question before this same year, 1908. See Phil. Rev., 8, 461 f.; 'Feeling and
Attention,' references to 'Clearness' in index.
•Together (for a time) with feeling-tone. See 1874, 273; 1880, I., 272; 1887, I.,
290; 1893,1., 282; 1902, I., 353; 1908, I., 412.
• I am in this paper expounding Wundt, and neither criticizing his views nor
trying at all completely to trace their motivation; the first thing to do with an author
(and it is what Britz has failed to do) is to understand him. I think, however, that
it is safe to connect Wundt's new paragraphs with the revival of psychophysical
interest shown by the works of Muller (1904), Lipps (1903, 1904, 1906), Titchener
(1905), Brans (1906), Keller (1907) and others. In particular, G. F. Lipps was at
Leipsic from 1903 on.
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magnitudes that accrue only to the elements; and so he
contented himself with the customary revision of the former
text. Natural enough, after all, in view of Wundt's age and
multifarious activities: the wonder is not so much that he
should have forgotten as that he should have had, in 1908,
the energy and the open-mindedness to attack once again
the whole problem of mental measurement, and in doing
this to effect a radical change in one of his most elaborate
systematic constructions. There is no possibility of recon-
ciliation of the two volumes; Britz's efforts are wasted labor.1
It would plainly be useless to reopen our questions of the
relation of consciousness to attention, and of degree of con-
sciousness to conscious status, in the light of Wundt's new
definitions. The clearness which is an intensive attribute of
sensation is at the same time degree of apperception (the
objective aspect of degree of attention) or of keenness of
apprehension.2 We may work out, if we will, what this
statement logically implies for the treatment of consciousness
and attention in the third volume; or we may wait patiently
for a seventh edition. At present the questions can be
answered intelligibly only if we ignore the intruding passages.
They can be answered, that is, only in the preliminary way
in which they have been answered above. This conclusion;
seems to me to be a positive result, which justifies our re-
course to the genetic or historical method. It far outweighs,
just because it is the result of a sound method, any conclusion
reached by Britz.
II
I must now say something in reply to Britz's polemic
against my own doctrine of clearness. If only Britz knew
accurately what he is talking about! I give a few examples
to show that he does not.
(1) Britz finds five principal "criteria" of the sensory
attribute. I am said to rely only upon two, inseparability
1
 But what was Klemm about, who read the proofs, that he did not call his chief's
attention to the discrepancy? See op. cit., 1908, I., X; 1911, III., V.
2
 Op. cit., 1908, III., 541 ff. The italicized Apperceptions grade of p. 541, 1. 16
should be Aufmerksamkeitsgrade.
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and independent variability; and I am further said to rely
mainly upon the second. Turn to 'Feeling and Attention'!
I there begin by criticizing the 'common definition' of an
attribute. From this definition I accept the criterion of
inseparability. As a mark of inseparability I instance the
reduction of the whole sensation to zero when a single attribute
reduces to zero. Britz, who raises this special case of in-
separability to the rank of a separate criterion, speculates as
to what I should make of the argument if I used it! From the
same definition I get the criterion of independent variability,
and point out that in fact " there are bound attributes as well
as free," so that "the test of independent variability, useful
enough for a preliminary survey, must be applied with caution
when we demand accuracy of detail." Yet this is 'Titch-
ener's Hauptmerkmal'! Hillebrand, from whom Britz de-
rives my two criteria, states the case correctly; so that Britz
has even misread Hillebrand.1
(2) Britz does not hesitate to criticize Bentley's experiment
with intensities of sound on the basis of the passing reference
3n my ' Text-book.' What series were carried out, what
intensities of stimulus were employed, what precautions were
taken, of course he does not know.2
(3) I never use the phrase 'degree of consciousness';
from my point of view it is as nonsensical as 'degree of
matter' or 'degree of material existence' would be in physics.
Britz disregards my definition of consciousness, and his dis-
cussion of the place of Bewusstseinsgrad in my system is
consequently all in the air.3
(4) Britz credits me with 'the assumption that the num-
ber of degrees of clearness is not the same for all departments
of sense.' What I say is that we have 'to determine, intro-
spectively, how many degrees of clearness can be distinguished
[how many just noticeable differences of clearness there are]
1
 Britz, op. cit., 14, 24; 'Feeling and Attention,' 8 ff.; F. Hillebrand, Z. /. Psych.,
1910, 58, 141.
1
 Op. cit., 26; 'Text-book,' 1910, 280; 'Feeling and Attention,' 361 ff. I take this
opportunity to correct a misprint. In Table II., p. 364, the second rubric under
Height of Fall should be 74.4-89.6 cm.
• Op. at., 41 f.
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in the various departments of sense'; I assume neither that
the number is the same nor that it is different.1
(5) I have just said that Britz misreads Hillebrand: here
is another case. "Hillebrand has shown in detail," he writes,
"to what absurdities we are led by the identification of
attention and clearness when we make clearness an attribute
of sensation." Hillebrand has shown no such thing. He
raises the question "whether every attribute has its own
clearness, as an attribute of the second order"; if it has, he
says, "that would lead to the absurd consequence that the
complete disregard of any one attribute brought with it, to
say the least, the disregard of all the others. . . . Here
Titchener seems to me to have overlooked obvious difficul-
ties." Perfectly fair criticism! but there is one absurdity
hinging on an 'if,' not an ausfiihrliche Darlegung of absurdities
in general.2
It is naturally disappointing, when one is made the part-sub-
ject of a doctorate thesis, to find one's views thus caricatured.
But enough has been said on that matter. Let us now see if
Britz makes any positive contribution to the discussion of
sensory clearness.
My thesis is that clearness or vividness (I am not yet sure
which is the better term, and there is historical warrant for
both) is one of the intensive attributes of sensation. Britz
complains that I say very little about its actual nature; and
in a sense that is true. You cannot say much about a thing
that you regard as ultimate to your science; any attempt at
a definition runs over, by force of circumstances, into what
Wundt would call a tautologische Umschreibung. I have had
recourse to a number of these periphrases; but I have tried,
above all, to exhibit the thing itself, to state conditions under
which it may be experienced and identified in experience.
Quality and intensity are here in the same box with clearness.
You can exhibit qualities or intensities, as you can exhibit
clearnesses; but when you attempt to define them, you find
yourself talking round them. If Britz had performed Geiss-
1
 Op. cit., 41, 42; more correctly stated on p. 12; 'Feeling and Attention,' 277 f.;
'Text-book,' 295 f.
* Op. cit., 42; Hillebrand, 146 f.
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ler's simple experiment with the two metronomes, equated
for quality and intensity of sound, he would have discovered
at first hand what I mean by sensory or attributive clearness.1
My thesis is, secondly, that sensory clearness is the ele-
mentary phenomenon in what is ordinarily called attention.
Just as sensory extension is the elementary phenomenon in
spatial perception, and sensory duration in temporal per-
ception, just so, mutatis mutandis, is sensory clearness the
unique thing, the psychologically ultimate thing, in attention.
Hence I remark in the 'Text-book' that "in the last resort,
and in its simplest terms, attention is identical with sensory
clearness." Analyze an attentive consciousness, and every-
thing is familiar to you but the one thing, which you finally
arrive at—this sensory clearness or vividness; that is new
and characteristic.
The importance of such a view for experimental psychology
is, I think, plain on the surface; a new road is opened, and a
road that by all analogy should take us an appreciable distance
to our goal, for an experimental attack upon attention. In
'Feeling and Attention' I speak accordingly of a 'simplified'
or 'elementary' psychology of attention; I suggest that we
start out, not from the gross facts of the attentive conscious-
ness, but from the 'rise' of the single sensation, the absolute
temporal limen, the carrying power of clearness under simple
conditions. "How far this elementary psychology of atten-
tion could be carried it is, evidently, impossible to pi edict,"
though there is no lack of specific problems; in any case, "the
results of experiment in these fields must be 'interpreted' by
a psychology of attention; the factors that make for clearness
must be separated from the other conditions involved, and
must if possible be separately estimated or 'weighted.'"
That is my view; and I am correspondingly surprised to
find Britz, who quotes correctly the sentence from the 'Text-
book' given above, asserting in several places that I identify
outright clearness with attention. If that were the case my
*Op. cit., 40, 41, 44; 'Text-book,' 53, 279; 'Feeling and Attention,' 26, 183 ff.;
L. R. Geissler, in Amcr. J. oj Psych., 1909, 20, 510. Britz devotes a special section to
Geissler, as he does also to Wirth and Jaensch; all three will, I expect, find something
to say for themselves.
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chapter on Attention would hardly have been written as it is.
But having made this identification, it is easy for my critic to
show that the introductory examples of attention—the shift
of interest due to the visit of a friend or to the receipt of a
telephone message—involve more than sensory clearness, and
that I am therefore faithless to my theory before I have got it
formulated.1
I hold, thirdly, that clearness is not an attribute of the
simple feeling; and as clearness is an intensive attribute,
ranging from liminal obscurity to terminal clearness (just as
intensity ranges from the very weak to the very strong),
this means that feeling is for me neither clear nor obscure,
but only qualitative, intensive and durative. The traditional
'obscurity' of feeling rests, I believe, upon the customary
mixture of logic and psychology. I realize that the whole
psychology of feeling is debatable ground; but, after all, the
discussion in 'Feeling and Attention' is seriously written and
deserves to be taken seriously. Britz gives a single sentence
to the matter. We ought, he says, to enquire carefully
whether the clearness of my two examples (the friend's visit
and the telephone message) is not applicable to feeling; "nach
meinem Dafurhalten kann er [der Begriff] angewendet
werden." But that clearness is evidently cognitive as well
as attributive; the distinction is clearly drawn, again, in
'Feeling and Attention.'2
I hold, lastly, that in cross-section the attentive con-
sciousness is arranged, for many and perhaps for most of us,
at two main levels, the upper of which certainly, and the
lower probably, are 'wrinkled' by minor differences of
sensory clearness. "A two-level type," Britz remarks,
"seems to me to be altogether beyond the range of psycho-
logical proof; it too obviously contradicts all and every
experience." Oddly enough, it seems to me to represent my
experience. Britz may very well belong to the multi-level
type, though he does not appear to have gone beyond casual
self-observation. He continues: "Within the apperceived
1
 Op. cit., 12, 40 ff.; 'Text-book,' 266 f.; 'Feeling and Attention,' 209 f., 251, 372.
2
 Op. cit., 42; 'Feeling and Attention,' 237 ff.
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{beachteten) complex there are degrees of clearness which
may be lower than the highest upon the low level; therefore
it is not permissible to speak of a 'niveau,' 'level,' plane or
surface." I do not know how he gets his data; but it is
surely plain that, if there are anywhere in a given conscious-
ness processes less clear than the clearest of the lower level,
these processes must be for me at the lower level. To say
that they are 'within the apperceived complex' means, if it
means anything, that my critic is thinking of the unitary
object of attention; and that means that he has fallen into a
form of the stimulus-error.
Hillebrand's comment here is more to the point. He
asks why, if clearness is an intensive attribute of sensation,
there should be only two main levels of clearness at any
moment instead of an unbroken section of the attributive
continuum. I do not know, though I might if I knew more
physiology. I do not know either why the constant of atten-
tion is 6; our theories of attention are still nothing better
than more or less plausible hypotheses. I am trying only
to ascertain the psychological facts.1
We are not reaping an abundant harvest. Nor shall we
fare much better if we ask, as I now proceed to do, why Britz
objects to clearness as an attribute of sensation. He first
examines the criterion of inseparability, and finds that the
attribute of sensation is not separable by sensory attention
but is, of course, separable by abstraction. Then 'as regards
clearness' he adds: "not every phenomenon that is in-
separable by sensory attention is thereby given immediate
status as attribute of sensation." This statement, in the
absence of examples, is a little cryptic; Britz may be thinking
of some form of 'inseparable association.' We need not guess,
however, since the conclusion is simply a non liquet. He
asks, secondly, whether the sensation disappears as a whole
when clearness becomes zero, and replies that, for Wundt,
it does not; Wundt has two limens, the one of consciousness
and the other of attention. How this reply bears upon my
position I do not understand; nor, by his own admission, does
1
 Op. cii., S3; Hillebrand, 148.
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Britz. He examines, thirdly, the criterion of independent
variability, and finds that clearness is not an independent
variable. He forgets (though Hillebrand had told him) that
I recognize bound attributes as well as free. He asks, fourthly,
whether a reference to clearness is necessary to the complete
description of a sensation, and decides that it is not. "Can
we characterize a sensation completely without recourse to the
notion of clearness ? I must answer this question in the affirm-
ative." Yes, but he does not show us in a concrete case how
the thing may be done. Further: a supposed attribute may
prove to be analyzable into a number of really primary attri-
butes. Yes, and I have been on my guard; witness my treat-
ment of Aufdringlichkeit and of tonal quality. Britz quotes
no cases. Further: very few psychologists have regarded clear-
ness as an attribute of sensation. Yes, again: and how has
attention fared in the history of psychology ? Listen to Ebbing-
haus: "Attention is a real perplexity in psychology. Both in
the general run of English associationism and in certain com-
prehensive works down to the present day it is altogether ig-
nored. In other books it bears the strangest relation to the
systematic presentation of the whole subject, and sometimes
an author seems to be entirely helpless." And when psy-
chology came to deal with sensations? I quote Ebbinghaus
once more. "All statements of any exactness regarding
sensations, their attributes, their liminal values, etc., imply
from first to last—as everybody always understands without
being specially told—that a high degree of attention was given
to them." In other words: so long as psychology dealt with
the full attentive consciousness, we made no solid progress;
and when psychology acquired methods of precision, attention
was taken for "granted. Now that a suggestion for the be-
ginnings of an exact psychology of attention are forthcoming,
one would think they were worth a trial. Very few psycholo-
gists have agreed, as a matter of fact, upon any general view
of attention.1
There remains, fifthly, the empirical side of an issue al-
x0p. cit., 23, 24, 30, 31; 'Text-book,' 54 f., 95; 'Feeling and Attention,' 26 f.,
326 f.; H. Ebbinghaus, 'Grundzuge der Psychologie,' 1902, I., 585 {., 588.
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ready raised theoretically. Is clearness analyzable and not
simple, derivative and not primary? Britz replies, on the
ground of critical discussion and of experimental work, with
an emphatic Yes. Clearness (both Wundt's and mine, appar-
ently) is a very mixed concept, deriving partly from the meta-
physical philosophy of Leibniz, partly from popular psy-
chology (we talk of 'clear' colors as we talk of 'pure' tones),
and partly from the properly psychological distinction of
degrees of consciousness; it may thus be very variously em-
ployed, under various empirical conditions, and its employ-
ment always implies a process which is of the nature of judg-
ment.
I have, now, said something of the value of Britz's critical
discussion, and I could say a good deal of the value of his
experiments. He worked with the tachistoscope (not know-
ing, of course, what I had said of that in 'Feeling and Atten-
tion,' though he had read Mittenzwey); he required his
observers to cognize and name (erkennen und benennen) the
colors exposed; and he employed a wissentlich.es Verfahren to
the extent, at any rate, that they knew the nature of his
problem. What the tachistoscopic analysis of the Erken-
nungsvorgang has to do, in any direct way, with the study of
attributive clearness, it is difficult to see.1 I shall not, how-
ever, enter into detailed criticism; experiment is best met by
experiment; and while a repetition of Britz's work will hardly
help us to a psychology of clearness, it may throw light upon
the psychology of Eindringlichkeit or insistence.
No higher honor can be paid a scientific theory than criti-
cal discussion based upon experiments which are conceived
and carried out expressly to test its validity. Here, however,
is a discussion that leaves out of account the original state-
ment of the theory, and relies wholly upon secondary sources;
and here are experiments that fall into line with the work
of Schumann and his school, but by the same token are
directed upon a complex process of assimilation. It is a
great disappointment.
1
 Op. cit., 40, 42 {., 54 ff., 67 ff., 75; K. Mittenzwey, Psych. Stud., II., 1907, 386 ff.
("Im Begriff der Assimilation findet sich von einem Merkmal der Klarheit zunachst
gar nichts.")
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Postscript.—Since writing this paper I have learned that
Dr. Britz is numbered among the victims of the war. It goes
against the grain to criticise thus sharply an author who can
no longer reply. Yet I am sure that Britz would have wished
his work to be seriously considered; and since the points really
at issue are not personal, but scientific, it is perhaps not too
much to hope that some other pupil of Schumann or Lipps
may carry further the study of clearness which Britz began.
